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1 – Introduction
In the present article we will examine an influential theory 
of causation, namely the ‘manipulability’ account advanced 
by James Woodward. We will focus our attention on Wood-
ward’s well-known textbook (Woodward 2004). Woodward 
has authored or co-authored other texts on the topic, such 
as Hausman and Woodward 2004 (this was a reaction to 
Cartwright 2002); but these articles were written (at least in 
part) to support the full-blown theory of Woodward (2004). 
As is well known, the manipulability account was developed 
to apply to a wide spectrum of systems, from sociology, 
economy, physics etc. to everyday life. In the present article 
we will focus on systems studied in physics, and argue that 
the theory should be adapted in that case, in order to be 
fully compatible with the particular mathematics of typical 
physical systems. The singularity of the systems studied in 
physics is that they are describable by complete sets of equa-
tions involving all system variables - which is rarely possible 
in other contexts. More precisely, we will argue that the no-
tions of ‘modularity’ and ‘intervention’, as they are defined in 
(Woodward 2004), are incompatible with a feature of system 
equations termed ‘coupling’. Coupling, a property of most if 
not all realistic physical systems, will be explained in Sec-
tion 2. Its incompatibility with modularity and intervention 
will be explained in Section 3. In particular, we will be led to 
conclude that typical system equations from physics are not 
modular, but coupled.
Allowing for coupling has an unexpected effect for the ma-
nipulability theory of Woodward (2004): it allows us to sim-
plify it greatly. Indeed, we will show (Section 4) that, for typ-
ical physical systems, of all the causal notions that are defined 
in (Woodward 2004), only that of ‘total cause’ remains. ‘Total 
cause’ would therefore be, for such systems, nothing other 
than cause simpliciter. 
Nancy Cartwright has extensively criticized the manipulabil-
ity account of causation, and in particular modularity, using 
a series of arguments (see her 2006 and references therein). 
In one of the articles, namely in (Cartwright 2004), she has 
identified the point we will investigate here in detail. She dis-
cusses a model of a carburetor, and comments (Cartwright 
2004, p. 810): “By design the different causal laws are har-
nessed together and cannot be changed simply. So modular-
ity fails.” As will be detailed in the following, this ‘harnessing 
of laws’ corresponds to what will be termed here (following a 
physics and mathematics tradition) ‘coupling of system equa-
tions’. Our aim is to study in detail all the consequences of 
this central concept, not only for modularity, but also for the 
definitions of cause proposed in (Woodward 2004). Such a 
task is made possible thanks to the formal detail and logical 
In the following we will apply the manipulability theory of causation of 
Woodward (2004) to physical systems, and show that, in the context of 
physical systems, the theory can be simplified. Elaborating on an argu-
ment by Cartwright, we will argue that the notions of ‘modularity’ and 
‘intervention’ of the cited work should be adapted for typical physical 
systems, in order to take into account the coupling of system equations. 
We will show that this allows the reduction of all cause types discussed 
in (Woodward 2003) to only one, namely that of ‘total cause’. We there-
fore claim that the manipulability account can be drastically simplified 
when applied to coupled physical systems
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coherence of the cited book by Woodward, which are just two 
of the merits of this text.
We said above that we will restrict our analysis to physical 
systems. But we would be more precise in stating that we will 
focus on systems described by coupled system equations. 
Physics doubtlessly provides the paradigmatic case, but there 
exists countless examples of coupled systems in other fields 
that can be mathematized (see Giordano and Weir 1988, Ch. 
7 for a wide variety of examples from other fields). Let us also 
emphasize that the fact that the theory of Woodward (2004) 
should be adapted for coupled systems, does not necessarily 
imply that it must be modified for systems from economet-
rics, biology, everyday life etc.: in these cases system equa-
tions are most of the time decoupled.
2 – Physical Systems. Coupling 
of System Equations
In the following we will use the term ‘physical systems’ to de-
note systems of ‘things’ (entities and their interactions) that 
are studied in physics. Note that therefore not every ‘physical 
system’ in a broader sense will be in our focus.  We suspect 
that Woodward’s theory remains valid as it stands for such 
‘physical systems’ in a broader sense, e.g. for systems stud-
ied in biology,  economics, etc.. Let us start by making a few 
introductory observations linked to the notions of ‘variables’, 
‘constants’ and ‘equations’. Many of these remarks will be 
known to a majority of readers, especially those with a hands-
on knowledge of physics, but they will allow us to define with 
clarity the concepts we need.
Physical systems are described in the practice of physics by 
sets of mathematical equations that quantify the relations 
that exist between the different parameters or variables of 
the system. In other words, for our present purposes ‘sys-
tems’ can roughly be equated with ‘sets of (system) equa-
tions’; obviously, such equations are typical for the physical 
subfield or domain in question (e.g. relativistic mechanics, 
thermodynamics, quantum mechanics, etc.).
 
We will focus our attention in the following on physical sys-
tems that are realistic and therefore somewhat complex, 
namely systems that are described by several variables (not 
just one) that intervene in general in several equations (not 
just one) describing the system. This property, to be defined 
more precisely in the following, is called ‘coupling’ of the sys-
tem equations. Let us note from the start that a majority, if 
not all, of the systems studied in physics are ‘coupled’. In-
deed, as a rule of thumb, if a system is characterized by N 
(dependent) variables, it must be described by N equations in 
order that the system has a unique solution to have a unique 
solution. These equations are coupled, else mathematical 
solution of the system would be much easier than it is: every 
equation could then be handled ‘on its own’ to be solved for 
one variable (see e.g. Boyce and DiPrima 1997, Ch. 7). That is 
hardly ever the case in physics.1
To illustrate the notion of coupling, let us briefly examine a 
pertinent example, namely Maxwell’s equations of classical 
electromagnetism – pertinent, since describing a potential-
ly infinite class of systems, belonging to such diverse sub-
fields as electrostatics, magnetostatics, and electrodynamics. 
Maxwell’s equations (Jackson 1999, Ch. 1) are a set of four 
‘coupled partial differential equations’, expressing a relation-
ship between the electric field (E), the electric displacement 
field (D), the magnetic field (B), the magnetic field intensity 
(H), and their so-called sources, namely the electric charge 
(ρ) and current density (J): 
 
∇ x H = (4π/c) J + (1/c) ∂D/∂t  
∇ x E = - (1/c) ∂B/∂t    
∇ . B  = 0    
∇. D = 4π ρ 
   
(The operator ‘∇’ effectuates derivation in the space coordin-
ates, but that is a detail of no importance in the following.) 
In the above equations, ‘c’ is the speed of light. We explicitly 
display the equations, because they allow us to illustrate an 
essential point for the rest of the article. One notices that the 
set contains variables (D and B) that belong to different equa-
tions; more precisely, all equations contain variables that 
also belong to at least one other equation – i.e., the equations 
are coupled (this is the more precise definition). The coupling 
makes mathematical solution difficult: none of the equations 
can be mathematically manipulated ‘on its own’ to derive a 
solution for a variable; they have to be treated in parallel.2 
Another example refers to figure 1, which represents an elec-
tric circuit, involving currents I, I1, I2, I3, an electric potential 
source V, and three constant resistors Ri (constants of the 
system). This system is fully described by following four rela-
tions: I1 = V/R1, I2 = V/R2, I3 = V/R3 and I = I1 + I2 + I3. Here, 
too, the representative equations are coupled: the system 
The ManipulabiliTy ac-
counT of causaTion applied 
To Typical physical sysTeMs
1 - The only exception to the ubiquitous coupling of equations we are aware of are (artificial) systems of non-interacting subsystems each described by only 
one dependent variable (say x), for instance a collection of N linear springs (evolving according to Hooke’s law). One could describe this system by N equations 
{m
i
.d2x
i 
/dt2 = -k
i
x
i 
, i = 1,…,N}. (The k
i
 and m
i
 are constants of the system, not variables, and the time t is the independent variable.) This set of equations is 
decoupled: each dependent variable x
1
, x
2
, … x
N
 only intervenes in one equation. However, such a ‘system’ is highly untypical and in practice not studied in physics: 
all the relevant information is already contained in the first equation involving x
1
. Solving the other equations is trivially redundant: they are the same.
2 - Let us note that the coupling is even more intricate than the Maxwell equations suggest, since in order to solve the set one needs additional equations, the so-
called ‘constitutive relations’, depending on the properties of the environment, the media and materials involved in the particular system studied. One example of 
such an equation is D = ε.E, with ε the electric permittivity, a constant of the system. These auxiliary relations introduce additional coupling between the equations. 
But that only reinforces our argument.
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variables appear in general in more than one equation (this is 
the case for V, I1, I2, and I3, but not for I); more precisely, all 
equations contain at least one variable that also appears in at 
least one other equation.
Let us repeat that only the simplest systems, those that in-
volve just one dependent variable and that therefore can be 
described by one equation, evidently do not exhibit coupling. 
But such systems are a small minority of all physical systems 
studied; and indeed they are not treated by Woodward 2004 
(the equations of the text always exhibit more than one de-
pendent variable). As already stated, the modification of 
Woodward’s theory we undertake in the following concerns 
only coupled systems - but all of them, whether from physics 
or other fields. Indeed, many real world systems that can be 
mathematized via equations are coupled. Physical systems 
are the most telling case, but see (Giordano and Weir 1988, 
Ch. 7) for a series of systems from economy, biology, popula-
tion dynamics, etc., all described by coupled equations. 
For the purpose of the article it is important to remember 
that the role of the ‘variables’ and ‘constants’ in the system 
equations is clearly distinct – as will be obvious to many read-
ers. For any given physical system, the constants are fixed, 
i.e. they keep the same numerical value independently of the 
values of the variables. In above examples, ‘c’ and the ‘Ri’ are 
such system constants: their value is assumed to be given. 
‘Variables’ of course play a very different role: within one 
system with fixed constants, the variables may assume differ-
ent values; the system equations numerically describe how a 
variation in one variable is linked (‘coupled’, one could say) 
to the variations of the other variables. For our purposes we 
cannot allow any doubt or imprecision to remain; therefore 
it is useful to return for a moment to the examples we gave 
above. If in electrodynamical systems, described by the Max-
well equations wecited, the source (or independent) variables 
J and ρ change (for instance due to human intervention, or 
due to changes in the natural environment), then the other 
(dependent) variables will also change (always for fixed con-
stants). Similarly, if in Figure 1 the potential source doubles 
its output voltage V, then all currents will double their value 
(while the R
i
 remain constant), as immediately follows from 
the mathematics of the equations. 
Let us now study in some detail the relevant parts of James 
Woodward’s theory of manipulability. 
3 – Coupling versus Modularity
Woodward (2004) heavily relies on the notions of ‘modular-
ity’ and ‘intervention’ in constructing his theory of causa-
tion and explanation.3 Our aim is to show that, in the case 
of physical systems, the definition of ‘intervention’ should be 
modified, and that ‘modularity’ does not hold for coupled sys-
tems. In (Woodward 2004) modularity is defined as follows 
(quote 1): 
More generally, a system of equations will be modular if it is pos-
sible to disrupt or replace (the relationships represented by) any 
one of the equations in the system by means of an intervention 
on (the magnitude corresponding to) the dependent variable in 
that equation, without disrupting any of the other equations. 
(Woodward 2004, p. 48) 
A similar definition is offered in (Woodward 2004, p. 329). 
Observe that, a priori, the expression ‘to disrupt an equation’, 
intervening twice in above definition, could have different 
meanings. It could be interpreted as I1) ‘to change the form 
of an equation’, or as I2) ‘to determine the numerical values 
of the variables of an equation’ - or there may be other mean-
ings. Under interpretation I1) modularity seems not to be a 
property of equations describing physical systems, because 
interventions, in the sense defined by Woodward below (and 
in the sense in which the word is used in physics, for that 
matter) do not change the form of an equation; rather, they 
set a variable in the equations to a given value (more on this 
below). More surprisingly, also under interpretation I2) of 
the term ‘disrupt’, modularity appears not to be a property 
of sets of equations, as soon as they are coupled, as will be 
explicitly shown below. But maybe we overlook valuable in-
terpretations; let us therefore see how the concept is used. To 
that end we need the definition of ‘intervention’4 appearing in 
quote 1, involving the variables X and Y (quote 2):
More generally and slightly more precisely, we may think of an 
intervention on X with respect to Y as an exogenous causal pro-
cess that changes X in such a way and under conditions such that 
if any change occurs in Y, it occurs in virtue of Y’s relationship to 
X and not in any other way. (Woodward 2004, p. 47)
The many examples offered in the text allow us to draw a 
clear picture of the precise meanings of above concepts. 
Let us study the most revealing one in detail. In Woodward 
(2004, p. 330) the following system of equations is discussed 
(we keep the original equation indices):
3 - These notions have been discussed (and defined differently) by other philosophers, e.g. (Spirtes et al. 2000; see Woodward 2003, 46-48 for a complete list of 
references). 
4 - The more detailed definition on p. 98 leads to exactly the same analysis as is presented here.
Figure 1
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(7.4.3)  Y = aX + U
(7.4.4)  Z = bX + cY + V. 
The equations – which are manifestly coupled - are rewritten 
as follows by algebraic rearrangement:
(7.4.3)  Y = aX + U
(7.4.5)  Z = dX + W, where d = b+ac and W = cU + V.
The author states (quote 3): 
Despite their observational equivalence, if (7.4.3) – (7.4.4) is 
modular, then (7.4.3) – (7.4.5) cannot be (and vice versa). To see 
this, consider an intervention on the variable Y in (7.4.3) that re-
places (7.4.3) with the new equation (7.4.3*) Y = y. In effect, what 
this intervention does is to set the coefficient a in (7.4.3) equal to 
0. (Woodward 2004, p. 330)
(The argument is that, if a = 0, d becomes equal to b, and thus 
(7.4.5) ‘changes’ (or is ‘disrupted’), so that (7.4.3) – (7.4.5) is 
not ‘modular’, according to the definition of quote 1 we dis-
played above. It would seem here that the author uses inter-
pretation I1) above.) Our point is that the phrases in quote 3 
do not correspond to a legitimate interpretation of the math-
ematical apparatus used to model coupled physical systems. 
First, as highlighted in Section 2, a coefficient such as ‘a’ is, 
in such contexts, a constant of the system: its value cannot 
change, and in particular cannot become 0. What is possible, 
is that by intervention one does indeed set Y to a certain 
value, y. But then y = aX + U according to (7.4.3), implying 
a = (y-U)/X (instead of a = 0). The point to observe is that 
this intervention on Y will influence X and Z, whichever set 
of equivalent equations one starts from, due to the fact that 
the equations are coupled. Indeed, if the equations were not 
coupled (if they had no common variables), they could be 
mathematically handled in a fully separate manner, as if, so 
to speak, the other equation did not exist. This ‘parallel’ influ-
ence of Y on X and Z may be obvious if one considers (7.4.3) 
– (7.4.4) since Y intervenes in both equations; but it also fol-
lows from (7.4.3) – (7.4.5). If this is not obvious already, one 
could easily prove it explicitly (in a trivial manner). Whatever 
value Y takes, whether these values are set by intervention or 
not, according to (7.4.3) X can be rewritten as (Y – U) / a, so 
that (7.4.4) becomes, by substitution of X: Z = (c + b/a) Y + 
V – b U/a (7.4.4#). By inspection of equations (7.4.3) and the 
simultaneously valid (7.4.4#), one immediately sees that by 
intervening on Y (by causing it to assume the value y), one ne-
cessarily changes or influences the value of X and of Z. Again, 
the reason lies in the coupling of the equations. This result 
holds independently of the representation one chooses for the 
system. Indeed, equations (7.4.3) – (7.4.5) lead (of course) to 
the same equation (7.4.4#) (one could say, based on (7.4.3) – 
(7.4.5), that Y influences Z through its link with X; X ‘couples’ 
Y and Z). This is a mathematically necessary property of sets 
of equations that only differ by algebraic rearrangements, 
such as sets (7.4.3) – (7.4.4) and (7.4.3) – (7.4.5). There is no 
mathematical or physical information that can differ in both 
representations. We arrive here at a conclusion that differs 
from Woodward’s, since he claims (quote 4): 
By contrast, according to (7.4.3) – (7.4.5), Y does not cause Z and 
hence there are no interventions on Y that will change Z. (Re-
call that an intervention on Y should be uncorrelated with other 
causes of Y such as X.) (Woodward 2004, p. 331) 
The phrase between brackets points out what is the central 
issue. The author stipulates that under ‘interventions’ one 
variable (Y) can be set in such a manner that another vari-
able (Z) is determined in a fully unrelated, ‘decoupled’ man-
ner. That may be an appropriate characterization for systems 
from economy, sociology etc., but such interventions do not 
exist in systems as soon as coupling between the equations 
occurs. We have explicitly proven this fact via our derivation 
of equation (7.4.4#) from (7.4.3) – (7.4.5): Y does cause Z, 
and this fact holds irrespectively of the equation set one starts 
from. For the system discussed, all variables are linked to 
each other via coupled system equations (coupling between 
equations induces coupling between variables). Clearly, this 
property can be generalized to all coupled systems (for those 
who prefer an explicit argument, see footnote 7). 
Thus it appears that in coupled systems ‘modularity’ does not 
apply, and that the unwarranted use of the concept can be 
traced back to an ‘unphysical’ use of ‘intervention’ – more 
precisely a usage that does not apply to coupled systems, and 
in particular not the example just discussed. Note that this 
particular interpretation of the mathematical representation 
of intervention is not yet obvious in the definition of the con-
cept as reproduced in quote 2. There is however a shift in the 
meaning of ‘intervention’ throughout the text, as was already 
noticed by Cartwright (2002, p. 414-15).5 Careful inspection 
of the text shows that the same use of ‘intervention’, violating 
coupling, appears in other passages,6 and, most importantly, 
in the definitions of cause, as we will show in the next Sec-
tion. Therefore, and for reasons that will become clear in the 
following, we will arrive at the conclusion it is this element of 
the manipulability account of causation that should be modi-
fied to make it generally applicable to physical systems.
An important corollary of above findings is the following. 
Our analysis points to the idea that systems represented by 
coupled equations should not be conceived of as being made 
up of variables that are directly linked to only a subset of the 
other variables, but to all of the other variables. Indeed, from 
the definition of coupling, it follows that no variable can be 
solved for by using just one equation: one needs all equations. 
But that means that a change (e.g. under an intervention) in 
one variable ‘propagates’ itself to all other variables.7 In other 
5 -  In the detailed definition of intervention (Woodward 2004, p. 98), the incompatibility with coupling is manifestly built-in.
6 -  See e.g. (Woodward 2004 p. 52, p. 100).
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words, all variables are linked to all other variables. Now, this 
has essential implications for the ‘graph’ representation that 
is extensively used in Woodward 2004 to depict and char-
acterize causal networks – i.e. networks representing ‘which 
variable influences which other variable’. Indeed, it would 
seem that, for physical (in general coupled) systems, the cor-
rect representation is one in which each vertex is connected 
to each other vertex. Note that the graph representation of 
Woodward 2004 is only based on the equations connecting 
the variables X, Y, Z,…, not on any time-relation between 
those variables: see how the notion of graph is introduced 
on p. 38ff., and examples such as (Woodward 2004 p. 49, 
p. 51, p. 328 and others). But as we have argued, due to the 
coupling of the equations there is no privileged connection or 
direction in the graph (when one takes the equations alone 
into account): all variables are symmetrically (and therefore 
maximally) connected. (As briefly argued below, we believe a 
causal directionality can be recovered by taking the time par-
ameter into account, but time directionality is certainly not 
implicit in physical system equations, which are well known 
to be invariant under time reversal. In real systems, the dir-
ection of time is imposed by the boundary conditions (of the 
time coordinate), depending on the real-world contingency of 
the system under study. For instance, in the current circuit of 
Fig. 1, in one experiment the potential V might first be turned 
on – by a button - and therefore subsequently induce the 
currents; in another experiment the time sequence might be 
reversed, when the currents are first generated, for instance 
by a moving magnet, generating a potential V (the equations 
linking the potential and the currents remain of course iden-
tical). Therefore a graph can only be given a directionality by 
placing, ‘a posteriori’ so to say, time arrows on it, indicating 
which parameter (node) of each branch takes on its value 
first. In sum, in the case of a typical physical system the direc-
tionality does not automatically follow from the equations – 
an idea that seems not always well represented in Woodward 
2004, if the theory wants to include coupled systems. ). We 
will not elaborate here on this idea, but this conclusion of a 
maximally interconnected network of system variables seems 
inescapable in the case of coupled equations. Since we have 
not presented a detailed proof of this thesis (it is not essential 
for our argument), let us introduce it as a conjecture, which 
we will call in the following the ‘dense grid conjecture’.
Notice that the graphs of (Woodward 2004) are defined in a 
different manner than in e.g., (Spirtes, Glymour, and Sche-
ines 2000), or in (Pearl 2009). In these works, graphs are at-
tached to probabilistic systems and are not directly derived 
from deterministic and coupled system equations. Such 
graphs can be ‘directed’, again if one knows causes and ef-
fects, i.e. what comes first. (But we conjecture that even such 
graphs for probabilistic systems will be maximally dense as 
soon as they represent coupled system equations, for the rea-
sons indicated above.)   
In conclusion, following Cartwright (2002, 2006), we believe 
modularity as defined in (Woodward 2004) is not a prop-
erty of (most) physical systems, in any case not of coupled 
systems. We have argued in detail that the concept of ‘inter-
vention’ as employed in the definition of modularity is in-
compatible with the coupling that exists between the equa-
tions of the systems studied in physics. This conclusion may 
be seen as an elaboration of a claim of Cartwright (2004, p. 
810), where the ‘harnessing of laws’ is discussed. We believe 
it is therefore safe to stick to the meaning of ‘intervention’ 
as understood in many passages in (Woodward 2004), and 
in physics, as based on the idea that an intervention sets the 
value of a variable to a given value. One cannot ask more of 
an intervention, if one does not want to violate the property 
of coupling. (So in other words, even if a broader definition 
of ‘intervention’ may seem logically possible at first sight, it is 
not mathematically sound when applied to physical system 
equations.) Also, with this interpretation of intervention, the 
only case in which equations can be called ‘modular’ is that of 
‘decoupled’ equations in the usual mathematical sense. Only 
if two equations are decoupled, if they share no common vari-
ables, can an intervention set the value of a variable in one 
equation without changing the value of a different variable 
appearing in the other equation. This may be the case in, for 
instance, econometrics.
4 – Implications for the Ma-
nipulationist Concept of Cause
In the present Section we will investigate in detail the conse-
quences of abandoning modularity for the theory of causa-
tion that is proposed in (Woodward 2004). As is well known, 
the theory strongly links modularity to the different notions 
of ‘cause’ it defines. One reads:
(…) I will assume that when causal relationships are correctly 
and fully represented by systems of equations, each equation will 
correspond to a distinct causal mechanism and that the equation 
system will be modular. As we will see, the notion of direct caus-
ation and the related notion of causal route is closely bound up 
with these ideas. (Woodward 2004, p. 49)
Closer inspection of the text reveals that, according to the au-
thor, a set of equations that allows us to identify ‘direct’ causes 
is a ‘modular’ set, representing ‘distinct causal mechanisms’. 
But we have just argued that ‘modularity’ is not an appro-
7 -  Suppose one changes variable x
1
 in equation e
1 
; in a coupled system e1 will also contain, by definition, at least one other variable, say x
2
 (if not, x
1
 will intervene in a second 
equation containing a second variable x
2
); therefore a change in x
1
 will change x
2
. If there are three variables, x
3
 necessarily intervenes in an equation that contains, due to coup-
ling, at least one other variable, i.e. x
1
 or x
2
; so a change in x1 causes a change in x
2
 and x
3 
; and so on if there are more variables. This can easily be seen in the system equations 
we exhibited as examples in the previous Section. 
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priate description of most or all physical systems. As we will 
explain in the following, it is then intuitively compelling that 
abandoning the concept of modularity leads to abandoning 
the distinction between the different types of causes that are 
introduced in (Woodward 2004), namely ‘direct’, ‘contribut-
ing’, and ‘total’ causes. If that were to be the case, our in-
vestigation would lead, for physical and coupled systems in 
general, to a substantial simplification of the theory. Indeed, 
especially in Chapter 2 of the book, each of above cause types 
is given a separate definition, which is striking in its logical 
detail, see especially (Woodward 2004, p. 51–61). In view of 
the importance of above conclusion, let us proceed carefully 
to prove it, by two different (and independent) routes.
The concept of ‘direct cause’ (DC) is defined as follows (our 
italics):
(DC) A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a direct 
cause of Y with respect to some variable set V is that there be a 
possible intervention on X that will change Y (or the probability 
distribution of Y) when all other variables in V besides X and Y 
are held fixed at some value by interventions. (Woodward 2004, 
p. 55)
The italicized part shows that the definition of direct cause 
directly relies on the concept of intervention in its ‘decoupled’ 
form, i.e. conflicting with the mathematics of coupled equa-
tions. Such a definition may be logically consistent ‘on 
its own’; it is however not synthetically applicable to real 
coupled systems – it does not describe such systems. As we 
have studied in detail in the preceding Section, a real inter-
vention on a coupled system will influence all variables, so 
that ‘all other variables besides X and Y’ cannot ‘be held fixed 
at some value’. Therefore ‘direct cause’ cannot be a legitim-
ate concept for coupled systems. Since ‘contributing cause’ is 
introduced as the complement of ‘direct cause’ (any cause is 
either a direct or a contributing cause),8 the former is likely 
to be not a good concept either, in the context considered. 
Indeed, the definition of ‘contributing cause’ in (Woodward 
2004, p. 57)9 explicitly uses the concept of ‘direct cause’ (and 
therefore intervention), which we have shown to be problem-
atic. Therefore, for coupled systems ‘contributing causes’ do 
not exist either - as defined. 
This argument suffices as a proof, but in view of the import-
ance of the conclusion, it is instructive to give a second, in-
dependent argument for the idea that the proposed distinc-
tion between direct and contributing causes is inadequate for 
coupled systems.10 Since this argument is based on the ‘dense 
grid conjecture’ of the previous Section, it may be found less 
compelling by some than our first argument. But let us em-
phasize that this second proof is fully redundant, in view of 
the first one. As well as on the concept of direct cause, the def-
inition, then, of contributing cause (Woodward 2004, p. 57) 
explicitly relies on the notions of ‘causal path’ and of ‘causal 
chain’ (see e.g. the definition in our footnote 9). Causal paths 
and chains are parts of graphs. It is essential for our second 
proof to recall that Woodward (2004) considers graphs as 
fully derivable from the system equations alone, not from 
any other information related to boundary conditions in the 
time domain (remember how graphs are introduced on p. 
38ff. and used in examples such as (Woodward 2004, p. 49, 
p. 51, p. 328 etc.)). The strategy of Woodward 2004 is to de-
rive graphs from systems equations, and causes from graphs 
(or equations), without using any other information. Now, 
a rough restatement of the definitions of cause could be as 
follows: either a cause is ‘direct’ either ‘contributing’ if it is 
part of a causal chain in a graph (see the last phrase of the 
definition). However intuitive this may be, we have argued in 
Section 3 that the image of a causal chain is not appropriate 
for coupled systems (at least not if these chains are to be de-
rived from the equations alone, as is Woodward’s premise). 
Indeed, we have argued that the adequate graphs as derived 
from the system equations alone are maximally dense grids – 
maximally interconnected networks, connecting all vertices 
to all vertices. In this sense, before considering time, there 
are no chains: geometrically all variables play a perfectly 
symmetric role. If that is true, our point follows immediately; 
the distinction between types of causes, as defined, vanishes 
trivially. Since we have not elaborated these ideas in detail, 
we submit our second proof as a conjecture; but it corrobor-
ates our first proof, which seems compelling.
Let us stress that the truly problematic notions for coupled 
systems are ‘modularity’ and ‘intervention’, not graph. With 
sufficient care, there seems little doubt that the notion of 
‘directed graph’ can be consistently defined also for coupled 
systems (as is clear by now, we believe this should be done by 
simply superimposing time arrows on the dense grid; these 
time arrows follow from the contingent boundary conditions 
in the time domain, see the examples given above). Therefore 
one could presumably recover good definitions of e.g. direct 
8 - See the last sentence in the definition (NC*) in (Woodward 2004, p. 57). 
9 - Here is the first part of the definition of contributing cause (Woodward 2003, 57, our italics): “(NC*) If X is a contributing type-level cause of Y with respect to the variable set 
V, then there is a directed path from X to Y such that each link in this path is a direct causal relationship; that is, there are intermediate variables along this path, Z1…Zn, such that 
X is a direct cause of Z1, which is…” (This is the necessary condition reappearing in the full definition on p. 59.) 
10 - A third argument is the following: we believe that the original intuition of the author (see p. 50) to introduce the notion of ‘contributing cause’ is questionable in the case 
of physical systems. On p. 50 an example of a system is discussed, for which the constants (a, b, and c) assume values such that a = -bc, implying that one of the variables (Y) 
becomes 0, so that X would not have a direct influence on Y. We cannot elaborate our arguments, but we believe one cannot infer causal relations by giving ad hoc values to the 
constants (see also the discussion following quote 3). In contrast to variables, system constants have fixed numerical values. Even if for a very peculiar system (a real situation is 
not provided) they were such that a = -bc, then the original equations still hold, and allow us to infer the causes without accounting for the information a = -bc. (Also, observe that 
in real systems a will never be exactly equal to –bc.)
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cause, but without using the notion of intervention.11 
Also, a concept as ‘direct cause’ as defined in works as (Suppes 
1970; Spirtes et al. 2000; and Pearl 2009), may very well be 
legitimate: the systems considered in these works are prob-
abilistic and decoupled. Let us note, in passing, that it is high-
ly relevant that Woodward explicitly states (Woodward 2004, 
p. 39) that the works of Pearl especially were his direct source 
of inspiration, and that these works use models inspired by 
econometrics (p. 39). We hope it is obvious by now that the 
mathematics of equations from econometrics (as from biol-
ogy, sociology etc.) differ in at least one essential respect from 
typical physics equations. 
If the notions of direct and contributing cause do not apply, 
as defined, to coupled systems, the only remaining cause type 
for such systems in the manipulability theory of Woodward 
2004 is that of ‘total cause’. It is defined as follows:
(TC) X is a total cause of Y if and only if there is a possible inter-
vention on X that will change Y or the probability distribution of 
Y. (Woodward 2004, p. 51)
Without surprise, the definition of total cause is the only one 
that accepts the ordinary meaning of ‘intervention on X’, 
as an operation that sets the numerical value of X. As we 
have shown, the other definitions of cause types are based on 
a conception of intervention that is illegitimate for coupled 
systems. We are thus led to the conclusion that the above def-
inition of ‘total cause’ is the only remaining valid definition 
of cause in Woodward 2004 for most physical systems. We 
believe it therefore captures the essence of the notion of caus-
ation in Woodward 2004 for such systems. As we will show 
elsewhere, such a simplified notion of cause is indeed in per-
fect agreement with the use the physics community makes of 
the concept of cause.
5 – Conclusion
We began this paper with a study of Woodward’s notions of 
modularity and intervention (in his 2004), which play an 
essential role in the manipulability theory of causation and 
explanation. We corroborated an earlier argument of Cart-
wright (2004, 810), and showed that these concepts are in 
conflict with a ubiquitous property of physical systems, 
namely the coupling between system equations (and there-
fore between system variables). Next, we showed that modi-
fying the manipulability account of causation in order to take 
coupling into account has drastic consequences: it substan-
tially simplifies the theory, leaving - for coupled systems - 
one generally applicable notion of cause, namely that of ‘total 
cause’. For such coupled systems direct and indirect causes 
should be defined in a different manner than in Woodward 
2004, presumably by referring to time sequences. 
Throughout the text we emphasized that our conclusions 
hold for typical systems studied in physics, more precisely for 
systems characterized by coupled equations. But let us bear 
in mind that Woodward’s rich and interesting theory may re-
main valid as it stands for other systems, such as ‘physical 
systems’ in a broader sense, systems  studied in biology, eco-
nomics, and other fields.
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11  - The idea of causal chain is indeed intuitive – think of the paradigmatic example of colliding billiard balls. Here it seems one could easily introduce the notion of ‘direct’ and 
‘indirect’ cause (some balls directly cause a given ball to move, others indirectly). As stated, we believe this could be done if one introduces time into the picture, but not by means 
of the definition of ‘contributing cause’ provided in (Woodward 2004), essentially because it relies on the definition of ‘direct cause’, and thus on a problematic use of the concept 
of intervention. 
SOCIÉTÉ DE PHILOSOPHIE DES SCIENCES (SPS)
École normale supérieure
45, rue d’Ulm
75005 Paris
www.sps-philoscience.org
CONTACT ET COORDONNÉES : 
Louis Vervoort,
Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche sur la 
Science et la Technologie,
University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM),
Bur. N-8310, Pavillon N,
1205, rue Saint-Denis,
H2X 3R9 Montréal, Québec
Canada
vervoort.louis@courrier.uqam.ca
louisvervoort@hotmail.com
HISTORIQUE 
Article initialement soumis le 6 juillet 2012.
SITE WEB DE LA REVUE
sites.uclouvain.be/latosensu/index.php/latosensu/index
ISSN 2295-8029
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.20416/lsrsps.v1i1.43
Vol. 1
N° 1   2014
70
REFERENCES
BOYCE, William, DIPRIMA, Richard. 1997. Elementary Differen-
tial Equations. New York: John Wiley.
CARTWRIGHT, Nancy. 2002. Against Modularity, the Causal 
Markov Condition and any Link between the Two.  British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science 53, 411 - 453. Article
CARTWRIGHT, Nancy. 2004. Causation: One Word, Many 
Things. Philosophy of Science 71, 805 - 819. Article
CARTWRIGHT, Nancy. 2006. From Metaphysics to Method: 
Comments on Manipulability and the Causal Markov Condition.” 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57, 197 - 218. Article
GIORDANO, Frank, WEIR, Maurice. 1988. Differential Equa-
tions. A Modeling Approach. Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company.
HAUSMAN, Daniel, WOODWARD, James. 2004. Modularity and 
the Causal Markov Condition: A Restatement.  British Journal for 
the Philosophy of Science 55, 147 – 161. Article
JACKSON, John. 1999. Classical Electrodynamics. New York: 
John Wiley.
PEARL, Judea. 2009. Causality. Models, Reasoning, and Infer-
ence, 2nd Ed. New York: Cambridge University Press. Book
SPIRTES, Peter, Clark GLYMOUR, and Richard SCHEINES. 
2000. Causation, Prediction, and Search, 2nd Ed. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. Book
SUPPES, Patrick. 1970. A Probabilistic Theory of Causality. Am-
sterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.
WOODWARD, James. 2004. Making Things Happen. A Theory 
of Causal Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Book
The ManipulabiliTy ac-
counT of causaTion applied 
To Typical physical sysTeMs
